Posts Tagged ‘interstate’

Maine Guardianship Violates Uniform Jurisdiction Act

JULY 25, 2016 VOLUME 23 NUMBER 28
Before any guardianship or conservatorship action can be filed in a local court, the court must have jurisdiction over the person subjected to the proceeding. For many decades that had meant (more or less) that the person must be physically present in the state, and not much more. That began to change in 2007, with the proposal, and quick adoption in most states, of the Uniform Adult Guardianship and Protective Proceedings Jurisdiction Act (the UAGPPJA).

Arizona, for instance, adopted the UAGPPJA in 2010. It has now been adopted by 45 states (plus the District of Columbia and Puerto Rico); the holdout states are Florida, Kansas, Michigan, Texas and Wisconsin. The law is intended to address, among other things, the problem of interstate disputes among family members — and especially to prevent warring family members from gaining tactical advantage by moving incapacitated family members involuntarily to a new state before filing a court proceeding. It received much of its impetus from the celebrated case of Lillian Glasser, whose family and friends fought over where to file her guardianship proceeding. In that regard, it is mildly ironic that one of the remaining states not adopting the UAGPPJA is Texas, where half of Ms. Glasser’s disputed guardianship case played out. Ms. Glasser herself, incidentally, died in her Florida home in 2011 — in yet another one of the few states not yet adopting the UAGPPJA.

The UAGPPJA actually addresses other, more mundane issues, as well. It establishes a mechanism for transferring guardianship proceedings to a new state when the subject of the proceedings moves. It also makes it easier for guardians (and conservators) to establish their authority in states other than the one in which the proceedings are filed. All that should make management of guardianship easier — even across state lines.

Despite its adoption in almost every state, there is precious little case law interpreting the UAGPPJA. A recent case out of Maine adds to the interpretation of the law, and helps reinforce the principles that gave rise to its adoption.

What should happen, then, when a person who needs a guardian travels across state lines, and comes to the attention of the court in a state where they do not live? If they got to the new state by the acts of a family member seeking advantage, it seems easy to answer that the family member’s misbehavior should not be rewarded. But what if there was no misbehavior — and, indeed, no family member or friend involved?

That is the dilemma that faced the Maine probate court in the case of Henry Smith (not his real name). Henry had lived for years in California. After he had a stroke in 2012, he was partially paralyzed. In an apparent attempt to get back to his original hometown in Canada, he sold his house in California and traveled across the country. He spent time in Washington State, Arizona, New Mexico and Georgia before arriving in Maine one day in 2013.

Henry checked into a hotel in Portland, Maine, and asked the staff to help him with transfers from his wheelchair to bed and to the toilet. After they worked with him that first night, the hotel staff became concerned about his ability to take care of himself, and called the police.

Portland police visited Henry, decided he was unable to make his own decisions, and took him to the psychiatric unit at a local hospital. From there, Henry was involuntarily committed for mental health treatment and then released to an assisted living facility — but not before a guardianship proceeding was initiated.

Because Henry had no family, friends or even acquaintances in Maine, the probate court appointed the public guardian to manage Henry’s placement and care. The court did give Henry some autonomy to make at least some of his personal decisions, but the public guardian was ultimately in charge of where he would live, whether he could return to either Canada or California, and what medical care he would receive.

Henry appealed his guardianship, and the Maine Supreme Court agreed with his objections. The UAGPPJA, ruled the Court, allowed an emergency guardianship order in Maine, but only for a six-month period. Since the guardianship had by that time already been in place for almost two years, the UAGPPJA’s jurisdictional limitations had already been violated. The Court did give the public guardian forty-five more days to figure out where Henry should be cared for. Guardianship of Sanders, July 7, 2016.

Does that mean that Henry must be released by Maine to continue his travels toward Canada, regardless of how ill-advised that plan might be? Not necessarily. The UAGPPJA requires that a person’s “home state” should have priority to act — and that means that California (his original home) should be given the chance to take responsibility for Henry’s decision-making. But if California declines or refuses to act, Maine courts may once again have the authority to continue the guardianship.

By our count, this is just the third appellate decision relying on the UAGPPJA (the other two were in Arkansas in 2009, and Tennessee in 2013). It seems that the mere existence of the law has significantly reduced the abuses that seemed so widespread when we first wrote about Lillian Glasser’s case back in 2007.

Conservator Has Authority Over Property In Another State

FEBRUARY 15, 2016 VOLUME 23 NUMBER 7

We live in an increasingly mobile world. That assertion is hardly controversial. The reality that America’s patchwork of over fifty separate legal jurisdictions can make for confusion and conflict is well understood by lawyers and observers. A recent guardianship and conservatorship case involving two states (neither of them Arizona) illustrates how that confusion can play out.

Ben Marvel (not his real name) bought a house in Spokane, Washington, in 2001. He let his daughter Melinda live there with her kids, and he stayed in the home from time to time — he also lived part time in Idaho. In about 2007, he moved in with his daughter and her family full-time.

At about that time, Melinda sued Ben for allegedly concealing her late mother’s will and failing to transfer her assets as directed by that will. As a result of that litigation, Ben agreed to transfer the Spokane house to Melinda; he signed a quit claim deed to her in mid-2007, and the lawsuit was dismissed a few months later. Melinda did not immediately record the quit claim deed.

Meanwhile, Ben’s son initiated a conservatorship proceeding in Idaho, and the Idaho court determined that Ben was an Idaho resident, that he lacked capacity to make his own financial decisions, and that a professional fiduciary should be appointed. Because Ben’s assets were limited, the Idaho conservator was directed to “facilitate” a reverse mortgage on his home in Spokane.

The reverse mortgage was signed in October, 2007, and the conservator received funds that helped pay for Ben’s care. Meanwhile, a few months later, the Washington court (where Melinda’s lawsuit had been dismissed) signed a new order and judgment confirming that Melinda owned the Spokane property; that judgment indicated that it would be nunc pro tunc — that is, that it would be effective as of the original date on which the lawsuit had been dismissed.

Ben died in 2011, and the reverse mortgage became due. The bank granting the reverse mortgage ultimately initiated foreclosure proceedings, and Melinda objected that the house was hers, that Ben did not own any interest in it, and that the Idaho courts had no jurisdiction to authorize a reverse mortgage over Washington property anyway.

To clarify this confusing story, this timeline might be helpful (we’ve added a sprinkling of dates not included in the above narrative):

  • 2001: Ben purchases Spokane house
  • Early 2007: Ben moves into Spokane house with Melinda’s family; Melinda sues Ben
  • June 28, 2007: Ben signs quit claim deed conveying house to Melinda
  • August 22, 2007: Washington court dismisses Melinda’s lawsuit
  • August 27, 2007: Idaho court initially appoints conservator for Ben
  • October 22, 2007: Idaho court directs conservator to facilitate reverse mortgage
  • October 25, 2007: Idaho conservator signs reverse mortgage documents
  • Early 2008: Washington court files judgment finding house belongs to Melinda, dates it for August 22, 2007
  • 2008: Idaho conservatorship terminated; Washington conservatorship takes over
  • March 12, 2011: Ben dies
  • December 8, 2011: Melinda finally records the quit claim deed signed by Ben in 2007
  • 2012: bank initiates foreclosure on reverse mortgage

There are several legal questions posed by this confused history. Can any individual secure a reverse mortgage (or a conventional mortgage, for that matter) on property that they no longer own? Can the failure to record a deed, coupled with the failure to get the court to enter a judgment, permit someone who doesn’t really own property to encumber it? Is there some explanation for everyone’s actions in this scenario? All are interesting questions. But the legal issue that catches our eye is this: can an Idaho conservatorship court make any findings affecting real estate in Washington?

In general terms, real estate is subject to the jurisdiction of the courts where the property sits, and not other courts. In Ben’s case, however, the bank argued that his Idaho conservator had the authority to handle all of his property and finances — regardless of where they might be located. Melinda, on the other hand, challenged the very power of the Idaho court to approve, direct, or even facilitate a reverse mortgage on out-of-state property.

The trial court in Washington decided that the reverse mortgage was valid, and that the bank could foreclose on the loan. The Washington Court of Appeals reversed, finding that “the Idaho court lacked authority to authorize a conservator to encumber the Spokane residence.”

The case went on up to the Washington Supreme Court, which agreed with the trial judge. The Idaho conservatorship proceedings, it decided, were entitled to “full faith and credit” under the U.S. Constitution, and the Idaho courts had considered and decided the question about whether Ben resided in Idaho or Washington at the time its proceedings were initiated.

The Washington high court also decided that, while the Idaho courts would not have had authority to change ownership of the real property in Washington, they could enter orders that indirectly affected ownership of that property. As an analogy, the justices noted that an Idaho court could enter an order in a divorce proceeding that directed one spouse to sign a deed to Washington property; the court’s power over the individual would permit it to affect the real estate in another state.

Once the state’s high court decided that the Idaho conservatorship orders were valid and enforceable, the problem became whether to find the mortgage itself to be valid. Since the deed conveying the property to her had not been recorded, the bank had no reason to ask her if she claimed some interest in the property. The bank’s reliance on the record ownership and the authority of the Idaho conservator was sufficient to find the mortgage to be valid. Onewest Bank, FSB v. Erickson, February 4, 2016.

Do You Need New Documents When You Travel Outside Arizona?

APRIL 21, 2014 VOLUME 21 NUMBER 15

It is late April, and that means Spring is in full bloom in Tucson. Many of our winter visitors (we call them “snowbirds” but not mockingly or disparagingly — at least most of the time) will be returning to Illinois, Missouri, New York, Wisconsin, or other, cooler climes. For that matter, many of our long-time residents and even natives will soon decamp to seashore or mountain, waiting for the heat to ease up.

This annual migration gives us a chance to talk about something we get asked a lot. Surely you need to have signed a health care power of attorney and living will. But do you need to have signed one in each state where you live part time? For that matter, should you sign a state-specific form for every state you visit more than fleetingly? And what about foreign countries — will your Arizona advance directive be valid in Canada, or Mexico, or Europe?

Generally speaking, there is less state-to-state law variation than you might suppose. Your Missouri will is going to be fine in Arizona (though if you’ve moved here from Missouri maybe your circumstances have changed — let us review and update your will. But that’s a different issue.) Your California living trust probably needs very little change for your new Arizona residence. But one area where there is a lot of variation is in advance health care directives.

What’s different? Terminology, for one thing. In Michigan they talk about health care “patient advocates,” and in New York they favor “health care proxies”. In both states they’ll probably figure out what you mean by “health care agent” or “health care power of attorney,” but you’d rather not make the hospital or doctor call the legal staff for an opinion. You’d rather just get good care, and quickly.

Another difference: some states permit broad powers in advance directives, and other states tend to be restrictive. Arizona is in the former camp. As many as half of the states would limit the applicability of your health care power of attorney to circumstances in which you are in a coma or persistent vegetative state; Arizona does not have that limitation, and so your Arizona form is unlikely to include that language. Furthermore, you probably wouldn’t want that restriction in your Arizona document while you’re here — why include a restriction that is not required and might cast doubt on the applicability of your advance directive, after all?

For many of our clients, the choice of agent is partly controlled by who is local and convenient. If you spend your winters near your daughter in Arizona, it might make sense to name her as your health care agent. If you return to Illinois, where your son lives, for the summer, you might want to name him as your agent while there.

There is a growing movement across the country — but not in Arizona — for something called “POLST” (some states use similar-but-different acronyms). That stands for “Physician’s Orders on Life-Sustaining Treatment,” and it is a very interesting and useful form by which you can have a “Do Not Resuscitate” (DNR) order in place before you go to the hospital or nursing home. Arizona has something similar, which is usually referred to as the “orange form” — but Arizona’s form will not work in any other state and no other state’s POLST form will work in Arizona. If you are concerned about resuscitation, you need to have appropriate plans in place in other states where you live part time or visit extensively.

So does all that mean you should have a new health care power of attorney drawn up as you drive across the border into New Mexico, Colorado and each state you go through? Not necessarily.

There’s at least one problem with having multiple forms signed. Under Arizona law, and the law of most states, when there are multiple documents that are internally inconsistent the most recent one is treated as revoking the earlier one. In other words, if you sign a new health care power of attorney as you arrive in Wisconsin this summer, you may have revoked your existing health care power of attorney. When you come back next fall, you’ll need to sign another one. The cycle can be endless, and the year that someone actually needs to make decisions for you will be the year you overlooked the update.

As for travel outside the country — that’s a lot harder to generalize about. In many countries the very concept of advance directives is foreign (that pun was completely intentional). Best advice: look up the country you’re visiting and see what you can find out, and take a copy of your advance directives with you just in case they’ll be helpful.

What should you do about domestic travel? Here are a few thoughts for the itinerant or part-time Arizonan:

  1. Plan for your travel when you first sign your power of attorney. Do you want your daughter to make your health care decisions while you’re here, and your son in Illinois? Tell us and we can draft for that. Do you spend lots of time every year in Virginia? Let us know and we can double-check whether Virginia is particularly problematic (we have — it’s not).
  2. Make sure that you’ve talked with family members about your wishes. Those making decisions for you need to know what you would want. Those NOT making decisions for you particularly need to know — we’ve had lots of cases where the distant family member said, more or less, “Mom NEVER would have said that if she’d been in her right mind.” Tell everyone what you want while you’re clearly still in your right mind, and that will reduce the possibility for conflicts based on where you are, what your documents say (or don’t say) and whose form you used.
  3. In addition to your advance directives, you might want to write some thoughts about end-of-life treatment. The best ones are in your own words, but there are others out there — like the well-known “Five Wishes” document, which you can create, review and pay for online. We would rather you didn’t sign this form, though — we don’t want you revoking your valid Arizona advance directive unintentionally. Customize it, print it out, and bring it with you when you visit us — we can talk through it and adopt those portions you like. Note that even the people who promote Five Wishes identify 8 states where the document does not meet requirements of state law.

If you do travel a lot, or have homes in more than one state, you probably are not a good candidate for a pre-printed advance directive form. If you signed your will (and maybe your living trust), and then filled out a form at the hospital, doctor’s office, church seminar or public forum, we need to see you again — you probably have inadvertently revoked the power of attorney we prepared for you when you first came in. If you haven’t yet gotten around to doing anything about this, get moving. First download the Five Wishes document (see above), or the Arizona health care directive forms, and then make an appointment. Let’s get this done.

(Note: don’t live in Tucson? OK — do everything we say here, but then make your appointment with a local lawyer who knows about this stuff.)

(Further Note: we haven’t said anything here about financial powers of attorney. There is also state-to-state variation in those forms, but the subject is quite a bit more complicated. We’ll take that up in another newsletter one day — when we have more courage and time.)

Will Rejected in Illinois but Approved by Indiana Courts

JANUARY 30, 2012 VOLUME 19 NUMBER 4
We are frequently surprised by how much trouble people cause for their families and heirs by not taking simple steps to properly plan for their estates. One thread that often recurs involves a fear (or perhaps disapproval) of lawyers, leading to failure to get good legal advice about planning, or about the execution of documents. This week we read about a different reaction, but with the same result. Florian T. Latek didn’t trust notaries.

Mr. Latek owned a small family farm in Indiana, but he lived (and owned real property) in Illinois. In 2009, with the help of a non-lawyer friend, he wrote a letter to the lawyer for a local charity he favored. The letter began “This is my will” and it proceeded to direct distribution of his entire estate to that charity and other recipients. Then he prepared four identical copies of the document, and signed each one.

Apparently Mr. Latek realized he should have the documents notarized, but he wrote that he did not trust notaries; instead, he included his Army serial number with the note that he hoped it would “be good for any legal matters.” Then he had some — but not all — of the copies witnessed by friends, and he secreted one copy (one that had no witnesses’ signatures) behind (not in) a small safe at the Indiana farm. Less than two months later, Mr. Latek died.

Probate proceedings were begun first in Illinois. The Illinois courts initially determined that Mr. Latek had no will; later, when the friend who had helped prepare the document got in touch with the charity named in the letters, the unwitnessed version was found at the farmhouse. When the charity’s lawyer attempted to introduce that will in the Illinois courts, it was initially rejected because it did not meet the Illinois requirements for a will to be valid. Later a copy with witnesses’ signatures was located, but the lawyer could not produce the witnesses to testify about the signing of the letter in the time given by the Illinois court to prove the validity of the will. The result: the Illinois property would pass according to the law of intestate succession, to Mr. Latek’s cousins (he had no children).

Meanwhile, the charity’s lawyer filed one of the letters with the Indiana courts for admission as Mr. Latek’s last will. If admitted, it would control the distribution of the family farm. The personal representative appointed in Illinois objected, arguing that Illinois had already decided that the will was invalid and the Indiana courts were bound by that finding.

The Indiana probate judge disagreed. The will was admitted to probate in Indiana, and the lawyer for the charity was appointed to administer Mr. Latek’s Indiana estate.

The personal representative appointed in Illinois appealed in Indiana. He argued that the U.S. Constitution requires each state to give “full faith and credit” to the rulings of sister states; once the Illinois courts had rejected Mr. Latek’s letter as a will, according to this argument, the Indiana courts were required to adopt the same ruling. The Indiana Court of Appeals, however, disagreed with that argument, and upheld the Indiana probate court’s admission of Mr. Latek’s letter as his last will. Matter of Latek, January 4, 2012.

What does Mr. Latek’s estate tell the rest of us? A number of things jump out:

  • It just makes sense to get help with setting up one’s estate plan. Assuming that it will all work out, that one’s Army serial number ought to prove one’s wishes, or that notaries are unreliable are not good ideas when dealing with the legal effect of documents. It is touching to note that Mr. Latek also told the charity’s lawyer that he should “tell the judge that we were classmates and do the very best you can,” but that just makes it harder to understand why he did not consult with a lawyer he obviously knew and trusted. Would the lawyer have charged him? Of course. But his wishes might have actually been carried out, rather than two different proceedings with two different results.
  • Mr. Latek looks like a classic example of the kind of person who ought to be considering a living trust. Rather than relying on two different probate courts to come to the same conclusion, he could have transferred both his Illinois real estate and his Indiana real estate — along with all his personal property — to a trust that would have been governed by the law of one state or the other. Would that have cost him something to set up? Yes. It would also have permitted his estate to be managed and distributed in a coherent and effective way, at (ultimately) lower cost than two separate probate proceedings in Illinois and Indiana. That would especially have proven to be true when the cost of one appellate case is factored in. If you own real property in two different states, you should particularly pay attention to the outcome for Mr. Latek’s estate.
  • State laws vary with regard to the formalities of wills. Some states require notarization OR two witnesses. Some states permit unwitnessed wills to be effective, provided that they are signed and in the signer’s handwriting. But here’s a piece of news for do-it-yourself fans: ALL U.S. states would treat a will as effective if it has both two witnesses and a notary. Yes, some states require the signer, the witnesses and the notary to all have been together at the signing — so it just makes sense to do it that way at a minimum.

 

Appellate Court Upholds Orders in New Jersey/Texas Guardianship

JULY 25, 2011 VOLUME 18 NUMBER 27
We have told you about Lillian Glasser before. She is a wealthy New Jersey woman with two children who disagree about where she resides, who should manage her health care and finances, and what should be done about financial actions taken in the months before court proceedings were begun. Much of the dispute centers over whether Texas or New Jersey courts should hear her case. That issue seems to have been put to rest, with New Jersey the victor.

To recap: Ms. Glasser, then worth about $25 million, lived in New Jersey. She occasionally visited her son in Florida (where she also had a rented home) and her daughter in Texas. In 2002, Ms. Glasser was persuaded to execute a new estate plan. She signed a will putting her daughter in charge of her estate, and a new power of attorney in favor of her daughter.

In 2004 and 2005, Ms. Glasser’s daughter fired her mother’s caretaker in Florida, moved Ms. Glasser to Texas, and initiated a Texas guardianship proceeding. In the meantime, she used her power of attorney to create a family limited partnership which she controlled, and transferred the bulk of her mother’s assets into the partnership’s name.

The Texas guardianship proceeding spawned a variety of legal actions. Ms. Glasser’s son, a nephew who was close to her and a family friend all objected in Texas. The litigation costs in Texas exceeded a million dollars, with much of the cost being paid from Ms. Glasser’s assets. The result: the Texas courts authorized her return to New Jersey, where there was more legal action pending.

After Ms. Glasser’s nephew filed a separate New Jersey guardianship proceeding, that state’s Adult Protective Services agency weighed in with a complaint alleging that Ms. Glasser had been subjected to exploitation. Those two actions were consolidated. Meanwhile, the Texas courts decided to wait until New Jersey had completed its review of Ms. Glasser’s situation.

In 2007 the New Jersey court held a 34-day trial on Ms. Glasser’s condition, the transfers of her assets, and the actions of the various players. The result: a judgment finding that Ms. Glasser’s daughter exercised undue influence and behaved in her own interest rather than her mother’s best interest, ordering return of all of the assets transferred into the family limited partnership, and appointing a bank as guardian of Ms. Glasser’s estate and an independent party as guardian of her person. That ruling was the subject of our 2007 update on the Glasser litigation. Ms. Glasser’s daughter appealed that ruling, as did two of the other litigants; much of the appellate argument focused on who should pay the extensive legal costs of the proceedings. The New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division (that state’s intermediate appellate court) has now — four years after the original court findings — ruled on those appeals.

Spoiler alert: the appellate court affirmed the extensive trial court decision without modifying a single finding or order.

The appellate judges approved the trial judge’s finding that Ms. Glasser’s daughter had exercised undue influence over her mother. They agreed that she should be ordered to put all of her mother’s assets back into Ms. Glasser’s name, to be managed by the bank named as guardian of her estate (what we in Arizona would call her conservator). They confirmed the daughter’s history of inappropriate and evasive actions with regard to Ms. Glasser’s placement and care, and agreed that she was not suitable to manage her mother’s personal OR financial matters.

Then the appellate judges turned to the extensive fees incurred in the various legal proceedings in two states. They confirmed the trial judge’s decisions that:

  • Ms. Glasser’s daughter should pay her own legal fees in both New Jersey and Texas. That meant that she would have to repay the money she had taken from her mother’s assets to fund the Texas proceedings, for which she had paid her attorneys at least $1 million.
  • Ms. Glasser’s estate should pay the legal fees of the lawyer she selected to represent her (the court having found that she had the capacity necessary to hire an attorney of her own choosing). It should also pay the legal fees of her nephew, who filed the guardianship action in New Jersey, without forcing her daughter to reimburse those fees.
  • Ms. Glasser’s son argued that his mother’s estate should pay most or all of his legal fees; the trial judge decided that it would not order her to pay all of his legal fees in Texas, and that (since he hadn’t filed a guardianship petition in New Jersey) he was not entitled to reimbursement for his New Jersey expenditures. The appellate judges agreed, noting that his sister had no standing to object to the amounts allowed in any case.

In the Matter of Lillian Glasser, July 21, 2011.

So how much did Ms. Glasser’s legal predicament cost her, and what was the total cost paid by all of the litigants in protracted proceedings in two states? It may be impossible to calculate exactly, but it is obviously several millions of dollars — after all, her daughter’s legal fees in Texas alone exceeded one million dollars.

Assuming (and the evidence is good) that the outcome is correct, was there a way to prevent the absurd expenditure of millions of dollars, the delay of half a decade, and the angst and anguish associated with this case? A few things might have helped:

  • A carefully created and well-documented estate plan, drafted at a time when Ms. Glasser was clearly competent, might have headed off some of these problems. It might not, however. Ms. Glasser did have an estate plan in place in 2002, at a time when she was competent to make her plans. Her daughter’s undue influence and over-reaching upset that plan over the next few years.
  • If both Texas and New Jersey had adopted the Uniform Adult Guardianship and Protective Proceedings Jurisdiction Act prior to 2005 then considerable cost might have been avoided. That Act would have made clear that New Jersey had jurisdiction and Texas should not act — the very conclusion that the respective judges reached, though only after more than a million dollars in legal fees. Unfortunately, the Jurisdiction Act did not exist in 2005. Since it was first proposed in 2007, about two-thirds of the states have adopted it (including Arizona). So far neither Texas nor New Jersey has. In fairness, adoption of the Jurisdiction Act might have sped the proceedings up by only a few months, and saved only a fraction of the many millions of legal costs.
  • Mediation of the family disputes might have been effective — but it might not have. The appellate judges made reference to Ms. Glasser’s son adopting a “‘take no prisoners’ approach to anyone who disagreed with his views.” Her daughter’s intransigence is pretty clear from her actions and her legal posture. Perhaps they could not have ironed out their differences.

 

Trustee Is Not Required To Create Special Needs Sub-Trust

DECEMBER 27, 2010 VOLUME 17 NUMBER 40
Kenneth Boyd established a revocable living trust in 2002. He named his daughter Carol Boyd as trustee, and directed that the trust be divided, upon his death, into three shares. One share each was to go to Carol, to Kenneth’s mother Elizabeth Boyd, and to Carol’s son Ben Scott. So far nothing is remarkable or unusual about Mr. Boyd’s trust arrangements.

Elizabeth Boyd entered a nursing home in November, 2007. Kenneth Boyd died a month later. When it came time to divide the trust estate among the three beneficiaries, Carol Boyd simply wrote checks to each one, and sent Elizabeth Boyd’s share to her in care of the agent under her durable power of attorney.

The agent refused to cash the checks. Putting the money into an account in Elizabeth Boyd’s name, she argued, would simply make her ineligible for Medicaid assistance with her nursing home costs, and assure that a third of Kenneth Boyd’s estate would go to nursing home care for Elizabeth. If Elizabeth Boyd’s share could stay in trust, it could benefit her during her life, allow her to remain eligible for Medicaid, and assure that there would be something to pass on to her heirs on her later death.

It seemed obvious to Elizabeth Boyd’s attorney-in-fact that the continued trust would be in her best interest. Language in the trust could be construed to permit Carol Boyd to do just that — to turn the distribution from the trust into a “third-party” special needs trust. Elizabeth, through her attorney-in-fact, ultimately filed suit in California, asking the court to compel Carol to continue to hold the funds in trust for Elizabeth but not distribute any proceeds outright to her.

Carol Boyd pointed to the language of the trust, which gave her the power to do what was asked but did not direct her to do so. She insisted that her father would have wanted his money to support his mother until her death (or until the money ran out), and she declined to establish a special needs trust. So the legal question became whether Carol had an obligation to do so.

In an unpublished opinion, the California Court of Appeals ruled that Carol did not breach her duty to Elizabeth by failing to segregate her trust distributions into a separate, third-party special needs trust. It was not completely clear to the appellate judges whether such an action would even be effective; in any event, the opinion makes clear that Kenneth Boyd’s trust gave Carol the power, but not the duty, to modify the distribution terms. Boyd v. Boyd, December 16, 2010.

As is so often the case, there were a number of complicating issues in the Boyd case. They help point up the importance of communicating clearly with the lawyer who prepares your estate planning documents, and keeping those documents updated. Among the complications:

  1. Kenneth Boyd’s trust actually left a larger share to his brother, James, who was scheduled to receive 40% of the remaining funds on Kenneth’s death. James, however, died just a year before Kenneth did, and the trust did not provide that his share would pass either to his surviving wife or his step-daughter. Despite the fact that James’ marriage was of long standing, he had never adopted his step-daughter — if he had, she would have taken his share of the trust as his child. Since he died without any legal “issue,” his share lapsed and was divided equally among the other three beneficiaries (Carol, Elizabeth and Ben).
  2. Carol Boyd was actually the adopted daughter of Kenneth Boyd. That makes no legal difference, and probably was explained to the lawyer who drafted the trust at the time. But the adoption had been completed when Carol was 32 years old, and she had never met Kenneth’s mother Elizabeth, his brother James or his wife.
  3. Kenneth and Carol lived in California. Elizabeth, James and his wife lived in New York. Consequently, the California courts had jurisdiction over the trust interpretation — but they had to consider the effect on New York Medicaid eligibility and trust law. Interstate proceedings often create additional confusion and difficulty.

It is extremely hard to know what Kenneth actually would have wanted in the facts as they developed. That is why estate planning lawyers go through the almost ghoulish routine of asking clients to imagine unusual sequences of family deaths and disability. The reality is that Kenneth Boyd died just a year after his brother’s death, and a month after his mother entered the nursing home (and qualified for Medicaid). If he had discussed the family situation with his lawyer during the year after his brother died, he might have made changes in his trust language. At least he might have clarified his wishes, so that the issue would not have to be decided by court proceedings.

Interstate Guardianship Law Adopted in Arizona

JULY 12, 2010 VOLUME 17, NUMBER 22
Among the less-controversial steps taken by the Arizona Legislature in 2010 was the adoption of the Uniform Adult Guardianship and Protective Proceedings Jurisdiction Act, which is usually referred to by its unpronounceable acronym UAGPPJA. The new law, which becomes effective on July 29, should make it easier for families to handle interstate guardianship and conservatorship issues. At the same time it should make it harder for warring families to move an ailing or demented family member across state lines for personal advantage.

Problems with interstate application of guardianship and conservatorship laws have been all too common. Imagine a typical scenario: father and stepmother, married for 25 years, live in Pennsylvania. Three children from father’s first marriage live in Florida, Arizona and Illinois. After stepmother checks father into a Pennsylvania adult care home, the children meet in Pennsylvania and decide they are better equipped to make decisions about their father’s care. Without telling their stepmother of their intentions they check father out of his adult care home, put him on an airplane, fly to Tucson and check him in to a nursing home here. Then they file a guardianship and conservatorship action in Arizona, giving notice to his wife in Pennsylvania.

Under existing law such a proceeding would be permissible, and could result in the Arizona courts making decisions about not only the Pennsylvania man’s living arrangements and medical care, but also over his (and his wife’s) Pennsylvania property. The cost and trouble of traveling to Arizona, hiring a local attorney and objecting to the Arizona court proceedings might well deter his wife from protecting herself or asserting her views on the proper care for her husband.

After the UAGPPJA goes into effect, however, such interstate moves to secure legal advantage should become ineffective. The Arizona courts will be instructed to defer to the courts of the home state of any proposed ward.

There are other frequent — and much more benign — interstate problems in guardianship and conservatorship proceedings that are addressed by the UAGPPJA, too. One arises when the subject of an Arizona guardianship legitimately moves out of state. Imagine, for example, that a working couple have become guardian for their 22-year-old son who is developmentally disabled. Now they want to move to another state, and they will take their son with them. Will their Arizona guardianship be valid in the new state? Will they have to initiate an entirely new proceeding in the new state? If they do not, will they have to report to the Arizona courts for the rest of their son’s life — even though Arizona no longer has any direct involvement in his life?

If the new state has also adopted the UAGPPJA (and so far 19 other states and the District of Columbia have) the process of transferring a guardianship or conservatorship is vastly simplified. A filing needs to be made with the Arizona court, then with the courts of the new state. Once both courts have agreed that the guardianship can be transferred, the Arizona proceeding is terminated and the new state takes over. The process is much simpler than a second proceeding in the new state, and it ensures approval from the Arizona courts before any action is taken. The same process can work in reverse for people moving into Arizona.

One other interstate problem arises when, for example, an Arizona conservatorship involves property in another state. Under the existing patchwork of laws, each state is different — and many of them require an entirely new conservatorship (a “protective proceeding” in the language of the interstate jurisdiction law) with court-appointed attorneys, bond premiums and separate accountings filed in the state with the property. The new law makes the process much simpler: once the Arizona conservator has filed appropriate documents with the courts of the other state, he or she can proceed as if appointed in that state. No separate court proceedings required, no additional legal fees incurred, and no potential conflicts between two courts overseeing the same conservatorship.

The UAGPPJA is available online through the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. Arizona’s version, the new Arizona Revised Statutes sections 14-12101 and following sections, differ very little from the proposed uniform law. The list of states adopting the UAGPPJA (which list is steadily growing) is also online at the NCCUSL website.

Some Advice About Selecting Fiduciaries For Your Estate Plan

APRIL 20, 2009  VOLUME 16, NUMBER 37

When it comes time to complete estate planning, our clients usually have clear ideas about who should receive their property, what health care decisions they would want made — even how they feel about cremation, burial, organ donation and most of the other issues that must be addressed. What stumps more clients than any other issue? Who to name as trustee, personal representative (what we used to call an “executor”), and agent under health care and financial powers of attorney.

Some of the common questions we hear from clients about whom to select:

Is it acceptable to name a child who lives out of state? Yes, at least in Arizona, which does not require in-state residency for any of the various fiduciary roles. With e-mail, fax machines, overnight delivery and other modern communications options, there is usually little difficulty for your son on the east coast (or even your daughter in Japan) to communicate. In fact, we frequently observe that we may have an easier time communicating with your the Iowa sister you named as agent than your nephew who lives on the east side of Tucson.

There is one small exception to that rule, and it is more practical than legal. We generally counsel that the ideal health care agent should live near you. Reviewing medical records, talking to doctors and caretakers, and developing a clear picture of your condition is much easier for someone nearby.

Can I name several, or all, of my children as co-agents, co-trustees, etc.? Yes, though we may try to discourage you from naming multiple fiduciaries. To the extent that you are trying to avoid family disputes, it is our experience that giving everyone equal authority tends to encourage disagreements. We will probably suggest that you might want to name your daughter (the banker) as financial agent, and your son (the nurse practitioner) as health care agent — and each as back-up to the other. If you really want to give them joint authority, though, there is no legal reason not to do so.

Speaking of which, is it better to name different people to health and financial roles, or give the same person authority over everything? There is no clearly correct answer. You know your family (and their strengths and weaknesses) much better than we do. If there is one person who is capable in all areas, by all means give that person authority as health care agent, financial agent, personal representative and trustee. You can segregate the roles as a means of providing checks and balances, or to give everyone reassurance that you value their input.

Do I have to tell everyone involved who will have which authority? No. But as a practical matter, we encourage you to do so. We want your daughter to realize, for instance, that she is the one who needs to make arrangements if something should happen to you. We hate to see someone show up, ready to act — and then find out they have no role. That creates confusion, and obviously can engender hard feelings.

We hope that you will share your estate planning documents with all your family (and any non-family members named as trustee, agent, or personal representative). There is no legal requirement that you do so, but it does increase the likelihood that any problems can be worked out while you are still alive, competent and in charge of your own decisions.

High-Stakes Guardianship Case Illustrates Multistate Conflicts

APRIL 9, 2007  VOLUME 14, NUMBER 41

Mark Glasser and Suzanne Glasser Matthews, brother and sister, have spent the last two years battling for physical and financial control over their mother, Lillian Glasser. The 86-year-old Mrs. Glasser, who at one point had an estimated net worth of $25 million, has been the subject of proceedings first in Texas and more recently in New Jersey, where a trial judge heard thirty-four days of testimony and argument last fall.

Nearly six months after the extended proceedings, New Jersey Judge Alexander Waugh has issued his ruling, appointing a guardian of the person and estate for Mrs. Glasser. Rather than appointing any of the family members who might have been candidates, Judge Waugh appointed New Jersey attorney Joseph Catanese as guardian of the person. Mr. Catanese had served as court-appointed counsel for Mrs. Glasser during the trial, and the judge indicated that her condition could worsen if yet another new party was injected into her life.

Judge Waugh also appointed a guardian of the estate (the equivalent of a conservator in Arizona and some other states), turning to the financial management firm Mrs. Glasser and her late husband had used before his death. Mrs. Matthews, her daughter, was ordered to return control of approximately $20 million she had transferred to a family limited partnership just before initiating guardianship proceedings in Texas (see the San Antonio Express-News report), and the judge made clear that at least some portion of the costs incurred by Mrs. Matthews to set up that entity would have to be reimbursed as well.

All of that is very interesting, and Judge Waugh’s written opinion reads like a fictional saga (for more detail and an excellent running commentary on the case, consider Texas Tech College of Law Prof. Gerry W. Beyer’s blog coverage of the case). What the Lillian Glasser case points out even more clearly, however, is a growing problem in guardianship matters—the conflicts that can arise between jurisdictions with the increased mobility of families, support systems, caregivers and assets.

Guardianship proceedings were initiated in Texas when Mrs. Matthews sought appointment as guardian of both her mother’s person and her estate. After Mrs. Matthews’ appointment as temporary guardian, another relative initiated the New Jersey case, arguing that Mrs. Glasser was a New Jersey resident and the question of her capacity—and management of her affairs—should be handled there.

In an earlier ruling Judge Waugh determined that his court should have primary jurisdiction over the guardianship. Luckily, the Texas judge assented, staying the proceedings until a hearing could be completed in New Jersey. Although neither state’s laws include explicit provisions permitting such an action, the two judges’ cooperation saved considerable expense and duplicative legal proceedings.

Arizona law also lacks a provision for resolution of interstate guardianship conflicts. In practice, such conflicts are handled on an ad hoc basis, considering the strength of the proposed ward’s ties to each of the jurisdictions, the location of principal witnesses, and other factors. Frequently the result is that the state where proceedings are first filed has priority, even though the stronger contacts are elsewhere.

The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL), which proposes uniform statutes for consideration by the states, has addressed this growing problem. A provision of the Uniform Guardianship and Protective Proceedings Act, proposed in 1997, would specifically permit the judge in one state to notify and consult with the judge in another state, and to decide whether to accept or decline jurisdiction based on the best interests of the proposed ward (see section 107(b) of the UGPPA).

Another growing problem involves movement of wards after appointment of a guardian or conservator. Under current law and practice, it may be necessary to initiate a whole new guardianship proceeding in the new state after a move, at considerable expense and duplicating much legal effort The proposed uniform law would also address that problem, permitting the final guardianship order of one state to simply be lodged with, and become an order of, the ward’s new state.

“Full Faith and Credit” Applies In Two-State Probate Actione

APRIL 5, 2004 VOLUME 11, NUMBER 40

A Florida court found Alvarado Kelly incompetent in 1960, and appointed a guardian to manage his property. Fifteen years later Mr. Kelly moved to a facility in Mississippi operated by Sarah Cuevas; he lived in that facility until his death twenty five years later. After his death Mr. Kelly’s brother William and Ms. Cuevas became embroiled in a legal dispute involving the courts of both states.

Mr. Kelly had signed a will while he lived in Mississippi, and he had named Ms. Cuevas as executrix (what we in Arizona would call “personal representative”). Shortly after his death Ms. Cuevas filed the will for probate with the Mississippi courts, gave notice to William Kelly as the next of kin, and secured a court order appointing her as executrix and finding the will to be Mr. Kelly’s valid will.

William Kelly then filed a proceeding in the Florida courts. He acknowledged that there had been a finding in Mississippi, but he argued that it was invalid both because he had not actually participated and because his brother had never been a resident of Mississippi.

William Kelly argued that since his brother had been adjudged incompetent and the Florida courts had never given specific permission for him to relocate to Mississippi, he remained a resident of Florida for the rest of his life. He also insisted that the will was invalid because Ms. Cuevas had exercised undue influence.

Ms. Cuevas filed a motion to dismiss the Florida probate, but the Florida court agreed with William Kelly that her appointment by the Mississippi court was invalid. A Florida bank was appointed as personal representative of Mr. Kelly’s estate and authorized to collect his assets.

The Florida Court of Appeals reversed the probate court’s decision, however. In doing so, it relied partly on the U.S. Constitution, which requires the courts of each state to give “full faith and credit” to the courts of sister states in most situations.

In this case, ruled the appellate court, Ms. Cuevas had given William Kelly notice of the pending Mississippi proceedings, and an opportunity to file pleadings and present his argument that any proceedings should be in Florida. When the Mississippi court admitted Mr. Kelly’s will to probate it made a determination that he was domiciled in Mississippi; if William Kelly disagreed with that conclusion he needed to make his argument in Mississippi, rather than just filing his own proceeding in Florida. Cuevas v. Kelly, March 26, 2004.

Mr. Kelly’s probate proceedings provide an interesting illustration of the “full faith and credit” clause of the Constitution, and of its application to probate proceedings. It also demonstrates that it is unwise to ignore the proceedings in another state, hoping to later file a competing action in a more friendly jurisdiction.

December, 2005, update: In a related case in the Mississippi courts, that state’s Court of Appeals ruled that probate proceedings were proper in Mississippi. William Kelly, the decedent’s brother, had argued in the Mississippi proceedings that there was no jurisdiction for a probate there, since (he insisted) all of Alvarado Kelly’s assets necessarily belonged in Florida where he had resided when he had last been competent to select a residence. The Mississippi chancery court (where probate proceedings are tried) had ruled that it would be “impossible” to imagine that Alvarado Kelly had lived in Mississippi for thirty years without accumulating clothing or other personal items. His death in Mississippi, coupled with the existence of any assets at all, gave Mississippi courts jurisdiction over his estate, and the Court of Appeals agrees that those probate proceedings were properly initiated. In the Matter of Estate of Kelly, December 6, 2005.

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