Posts Tagged ‘mental capacity’

In Rare Challenge, Court Finds Revocation of Will Effective

FEBRUARY 22, 2010  VOLUME 17, NUMBER 6

The popular conception of the probate process and the making of wills is colored by misinformation from a number of sources. Movies, books and plays provide much of the misunderstanding, building an expectation of “the reading of the will” in a lawyer’s office (it just doesn’t happen), regular will contests (they are quite rare) and regular revocation of wills. That last is especially rare, and so a recent case focusing on how one revokes a will, and what level of mental capacity it requires, is a legal gem.

Why don’t people revoke their wills more often? They do — but the nearly universal way one revokes a will is to sign a new will, which recites that any previous wills are no longer effective. It is especially rare to destroy an existing will without signing a new one. When that does happen, the person no longer has a will at all — and the state law of “intestate succession” takes effect, just as it would if there had never been a will.

So how does one revoke a will, if they are for some reason not inclined to sign a new one? There are any number of ways to do so, but the classic method is for the person to physically tear his or her own will into at least two pieces. What Bill Potts did was more elaborate: he drew lines through every line of text, applied Liquid Paper to the names of the beneficiaries he had listed in the will, wrote “void” over each paragraph, and then wrote “bastard” and “get nothing” next to some of the names. Just to make sure he had driven his point home, he later took the marked-up document to his insurance agent’s office and fed it to their shredder.

As an aside, Mr. Potts’ approach would have worked just fine under Arizona law, too. The statute in Arizona requires only that the testator (the person who signed the will in the first place) perform “a revocatory act on the will.” That includes burning, tearing, canceling, obliterating or destroying the will or any part of it. It does not include telling someone else to do any of those things, unless the testator is conscious and physically present at the time.

After Mr. Potts died the individuals named in the will sought to admit a copy to the Arkansas probate courts. They argued that Mr. Potts had suffered from “insane delusions” at the time he tried to revoke the will, and that his revocation was ineffective.

The trial in probate court primarily focused on Mr. Potts’ belief that his late wife might have had an affair with one of the beneficiaries named in his will, that another might have stolen a gold bracelet belonging to his wife. A psychiatrist testified that those beliefs were the product of a “delusional disorder.” The trial judge found that Mr. Potts’ belief about his wife’s infidelity was probably wrong, and that his poor hearing and irascible nature probably contributed to a misunderstanding about the bracelet, Still, ruled the judge, the will beneficiaries had not met their burden of showing that Mr. Potts lacked testamentary capacity when he revoked his will, and therefore the revocation was effective. Bill Potts died intestate.

The Arkansas Court of Appeals agreed, and upheld the probate court’s ruling. The appellate court spent some time considering whether there was sufficient evidence that Mr. Potts had the level of capacity needed to write a will — the same standard that would be applicable to determining whether he had the capacity to revoke a will. Although Mr. Potts frequently claimed, for example, that he had no relatives, the appellate court agreed that he probably meant that he had no surviving close relatives. Meanwhile, he could identify some, perhaps most, of his remaining distant relatives, and he just didn’t know where they lived, or even whether they were still alive.

“The evidence clearly showed that Bill was an irascible, angry, suspicious, controlling, profane and difficult man for most of his adult life,” wrote the appellate judges. That, however, was not enough to find his will revocation invalid. He had the capacity to revoke his will, and presumably he would have had the capacity to sign a new will — if he had known who he wanted his estate to go to. Heirs of Goza v. Estate of Potts, February 17, 2010.

Share

Court Distinguishes Between Undue Influence, Incapacity

DECEMBER 28 , 2009  VOLUME 16, NUMBER 66

Contrary to public perceptions, will contests are actually rare. In fact, few wills are written in such a way that anyone would benefit from a contest — most wills leave property to the same people who would inherit if there was no will. When there is a will contest, however, the two most common grounds are allegations of (1) lack of testamentary capacity, or (2) undue influence exerted by someone. A recent Texas case highlights the differences between those two allegations.

Evelyn Marie Reno died at age 81. She had been married twice, and left three children from her first marriage and one daughter from the second. The youngest child, Jan LeGrand, did not get along well with her half-siblings. Relationships between Ms. Reno and the three children from her first marriage were also strained — at least partially because two of them had initiated a guardianship proceeding (which was later dismissed) against their mother.

Ms. Reno spent the last year of her life in a nursing home. Ms. LeGrand visited her regularly, paid all her bills, and kept her location a secret from her half-siblings. At some point in the year before she died, Ms. Reno asked her daughter to help her prepare a new will disinheriting her other three children and leaving her entire estate to Ms. LeGrand.

The will was prepared (by Ms. LeGrand), and signed in Ms. Reno’s nursing home room. The witnesses were a hospice worker and chaplain, and the notary public was a nursing home employee. Ms. LeGrand was asked to leave the room while the three non-family members discussed the will and watched her sign it.

After Ms. Reno’s death the will was filed with the probate court by Ms. LeGrand. The three half-siblings proposed an earlier will, which left most of the estate to the four children equally.

The Probate Court ruled that Ms. Reno lacked testamentary capacity at the time the last will was signed, and that she was subjected to undue influence by her daughter. The earlier will (and a codicil) were instead admitted to probate.

The Texas Court of Appeals analyzed the findings of the Probate Court, and modified the basis for its findings — while not changing the result. The evidence, according to the appellate court, showed that Ms. Reno DID have testamentary capacity. Though she was often confused, the two witnesses and the notary agreed that the will was signed on a good day. Evidence of confusion and occasional disorientation on days before and after the will signing was not enough to overcome the testimony that she knew what she was signing, who her children were and what she intended to do at the time she signed the will.

The appeals judges agreed with the Probate Court, however, on the subject of undue influence. A key part of the evidence considered by the Court of Appeals: the fact that the will was actually prepared by Ms. LeGrand. As the Court wrote: “the fact that LeGrand personally prepared teh will without the intervention of an atotrney or other third party is significant.”

Also important to the court’s analysis: Ms. LeGrand had sole access to Ms. Reno for more than a year (during which time their mother’s whereabouts were not shared with the other three children). During that time, noted the Court of Appeals, Ms. Reno was completely dependent on Ms. LeGrand for bill-paying, care management and personal contact.

A more subtle distinction is drawn by the appellate judges with regard to Ms. Reno’s declining mental status. Though her condition at the moment of signing the will did not support the allegations of lack of testamentary capacity, her growing confusion and periodic mental weakness made her susceptible to undue influence.

Finally, the Court of Appeals notes that the will prepared by Ms. LeGrand for her mother was a complete shift from her prior wills. In each of those she made specific bequests to her four children and thirteen grandchildren, plus hospitals, her church and her pastor. The last will, however, left everything to one daughter — and this significant change in her dispositive plan was yet another indication of undue influence.

Though family members often confuse the concepts of testamentary capacity and undue influence, the legal analysis of the two different approaches to will contests is well-developed. It is also important to note that not every attempt to talk someone into making a new will is automatically subject to challenge. As the Reno court opined, in somewhat dry legalistic language: “One may request, importune, or entreat another to create a favorable dispositive instrument, but unless th eimportunities or entreaties are shown to be so excessive as to subver the will of the maker, they will not taint the validity of the instrument.”

The difference between “lack of testamentary capacity” and “undue influence” is legalistic, to be sure, but it is more than just academic. Interestingly, the Texas Court of Appeals noted that there is a difference in the burden of proof borne by the parties in the two different kinds of cases. In a case alleging lack of testamentary capacity the proponent of the will has the burden of proving that the testator understood what she was doing. In an allegation of undue influence, the challenger carries the burden of proof.

That means that each side in Ms. Reno’s case met their burden of proof. That is, Ms. LeGrand showed that her mother understood what she was doing, but the other three children demonstrated that Ms. LeGrand unduly influenced their mother. Estate of Reno, December 18, 2009.

Share
©2012 Fleming & Curti, PLC