Posts Tagged ‘right of survivorship’

Joint Tenancy Does Not Always Mean Equal Ownership

NOVEMBER 8, 2010 VOLUME 17 NUMBER 35
Elder law attorneys often see some version of the same story. Parents put child’s name on the deed to their home “just in case.” Dispute between parents and child breaks out when child asserts ownership interest. Sometimes litigation ensues. Child claims that joint ownership of the home means just that — the child owns an interest. The parents claim that putting the child’s name on the deed was just a convenience, or an estate planning device, or a mistake.

The resolution of the recurring story will depend very heavily on individual facts. It should be easy to see that evidence of conversations between the parents and child will tip the result one way or the other, and that written agreements will be even more persuasive than remembered conversations. Again and again, though, we see cases where family members just couldn’t imagine having disagreements in the future. Sometimes the analysis is complicated by the family’s failure to be clear about complicated legal relationships from the outset.

A good illustration of this repeating story is reported in a Missouri appellate case from a few weeks ago. Evan and Evelyn Hoit, who had lived on a Kansas farm for nearly four decades, decided to move closer to their two daughters in Kearney, Missouri. They told Mrs. Hoit’s son (from a prior marriage), Brent Rankin; he and his wife thought it might be a good idea to move closer to family, too. The Rankins suggested that the Hoits could look for a home in Kearney for them, too.

The Rankins had been pre-qualified for a loan, and had hired a real estate agent to find them some likely candidates. They asked the Hoits to check out a couple of the best candidates. The Hoits did, but also went looking for their own place; they found a house that they thought would be perfect for them, and told the Rankins they were going to buy it. The Hoits offered to let the Rankins live in the lower level, but Mrs. Hoit told her son that they intended to buy the house in any event.

The Rankins thought the house would work for them, too; they suggested that the Hoits buy it and let them live there. The Hoits put down 25% of the purchase price. The Rankins agreed to borrow the remainder, since they had pre-qualified for a loan and the Hoit’s farm had not yet sold. No one discussed exactly how the title would be taken, though everyone understood that when the Hoits died the Rankins would inherit the house. Mrs. Hoit later explained that she had intended to leave her other assets — all the couple’s cash and investments — to their two daughters.

Although the couples did not explicitly discuss the title arrangements, the lender apparently made a decision that it would be important to get all four names on the property (and the loan). The result: the four individuals ended up owning the property as joint tenants with right of survivorship.

When the Hoit farm in Kansas sold two months later, they paid off the mortgage with the proceeds. But when they tried to move into the house, they found that the Rankins had taken over one upstairs room that Mrs. Hoit had expressly reserved for her piano, and that there was little space for them to put the rest of their furniture. The family relationships began to fray almost immediately.

Within a few months the Hoits were demanding that the Rankins move out of the house. The Rankins refused, claiming that they owned the property. The Hoits ended up buying another house in Kearney and moving into it. Then they filed a lawsuit asking the courts to decide how much of the first home belonged to them, and how much (if any) to the Rankins.

The trial judge ruled that the Hoits had paid almost the entire cost of purchasing and maintaining the home — their contribution had been $192,734.26, as compared to the $2,757.48 paid by the Rankins. He awarded the home to the Hoits and imposed a lien against it in favor of the Rankins for their small contribution. The Rankins appealed, arguing that they owned half of the home.

The Missouri Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court holding. It noted that, though there is a presumption of equal ownership in joint tenancy titling, that presumption can be overcome by showing the unequal contributions of the joint owners. The appellate court expressly noted that one of the choices available to the Hoits would have been a “beneficiary deed” (recognized in Missouri, as in Arizona and about a dozen other states), but that the evidence showed that the choice of deed was made not by the Hoits but by the lender. Hoit v. Rankin, September 28, 2010.

Though both the trial judge and the appellate court agreed that the evidence was clear that the Hoits did not intend to make a present gift of the property, that successful (for them) outcome may be beside the point. This family, which once got along well enough to experiment with a shared living arrangement, has now spent thousands of dollars in legal fees and two years in the courts battling over what they intended when they started their experiment. Would they have gotten a happier result if one or both couples had talked with a lawyer in advance, and considered what might happen if things didn’t work out as well as they hoped?

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Late-Life Marriage Leads To Property Dispute in Divorce

MARCH 15, 2010  VOLUME 17, NUMBER 9

Older individuals often get married, of course, and sometimes face legal issues as a result of separation or divorce. The legal problems associated with the end of a late-life marriage are not necessarily different from those faced by younger divorcing couples. A recent Arizona Court of Appeals decision addresses one difference that often occurs.

When Norman and Judy Flower married he was 76 and she was 55. She had a son from a former marriage, and each of them owned a home. Mr. Flower promptly transferred his home into joint ownership with his new wife; Mrs. Flower’s son was already on the title to her home, and she did not add Mr. Flower.

The couple lived together in Mr. Flower’s home for six months, while they fixed up Mrs. Flower’s residence. They took out a line of credit secured by Mr. Flower’s home and spent a total of at least $32,000 on Mrs. Flower’s home. They accumulated a total of $61,000 of debt during the marriage. After the work was done on Mrs. Flower’s home they moved into it, and her son moved into the jointly-owned home that had originally belonged to Mr. Flower.

A year after the marriage, Mr. Flower decided that his wife had been interested in him only for financial reasons and he filed a petition seeking an annulment. Mrs. Flower responded by asking for a divorce, and insisted that she was entitled to a half interest in what had been Mr. Flower’s home, all of her own (now improved) home, and no obligation to repay any of the costs of improvements to her home.

Arizona law, like that of many jurisdictions, assumes that the property division in a divorce proceeding will usually be roughly equal. The legal term, however, requires that it be “equitable,” and in rare cases that can mean something other than an equal division. The trial judge decided this was such a case.

Although the trial court denied Mr. Flower’s request for an annulment, it did grant the couple a divorce. The judge also returned Mr. Flower’s residence to him, although it required him to pay the majority of the debt the couple had accumulated. Mrs. Flower was awarded her home without any claim for the improvements made during the marriage, and she was ordered to pay $16,000 of the couple’s debts. Mrs. Flower appealed.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the unequal division of property and debts. Given the unusual facts of this case, ruled the appellate judges, the usual requirement of “substantially equal” division need not be applied. The appellate court noted that though Mr. Flower received his home, he was also required to pay most of the community’s debt incurred during a relatively brief marriage. Flower v. Flower, February 25, 2010.

Arizona, of course, is a “community property” state. Does that mean that the result in a state that did not apply community property rules would be different? Perhaps, but not necessarily. Most states apply some version of Arizona’s requirement that property division be “equitable” and assume that usually means “equal.” While Mr. and Mrs. Flowers did initially transfer his residence into “community property with right of survivorship,” the result in Arizona would not have been different if they had transferred it to “joint tenancy with right of survivorship.”

Is the result in the Flower case unusual based on unusual facts? Not really. The same day that the Arizona Court of Appeals decided the Flower property division issues, it also handled another, similar case. Retirees Carolyn and Lowell Inboden (the opinion does not give their ages) had married and purchased a vacant lot as joint tenants, but using $90,000 of Mrs. Inboden’s separate money from before the marriage. They then built a home on the lot, using $67,000 of her money, $46,500 of his, and a lot of sweat (they acted as their own general contractors).

When Mr. and Mrs. Inboden divorced a little less than two years after the marriage (and just a few months after the house was completed), the trial judge awarded her about three-quarters of the value of the home to reimburse her for her disproportionate contribution to its purchase and construction. The Court of Appeals reversed that result and returned it for further consideration.

In the case of the Inbodens’ property division, the appellate court was clear that the final result might well be an unequal division. The basis for any deviation, however, must be based on “equitable” principles, and not on a simple calculation to reimburse each spouse for their contribution of property that was previously separate. There is a presumption, difficult to overcome, that changes of title or transfers of assets are intended to be gifts, and those gifts can not be reversed if the marriage later falters. Inboden v. Inboden, February 25, 2010.

Why are these divorce issues “elder law” concerns? They are not, really — except that when older couples marry they are more likely to have property that they bring into the marriage, and less likely to have minor children. Consequently, if their later-in-life marriages fail they are perhaps more likely to present complicated property division issues and less likely to focus on child custody and support problems.

Of course, divorce is not the only venue for property division concerns. Even the popular press has begun to consider the possibility that later-in-life marriages might create property disputes between surviving spouses and children from prior marriages or relationships.

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